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PETROLEUM EXECUTIVE AGENCY -A FORCING FUNCTION FOR JOINTNESS
The synergistic effect created by the simultaneous application of complementary capabilities is what makes us the best joint force in the world.
-Gordon R. Sullivan
Jointness is the essential capability that sets the U.S. military apart from all others.
Interoperable and interdependent Services enable the Combatant Commander (COCOM) to choose from a vast array of capabilities to achieve the desired effects. This is true in Combat,
Combat Support as well as in Combat Service Support roles. The National Military Strategy states, "Defeating adaptive adversaries requires flexible, modular and deployable joint forces with the ability to combine the strengths of individual Services, combatant commands, other government agencies and multinational partners. Joint forces will require new levels of interoperability and systems that are "born joint," i.e. conceptualized and designed with joint architectures and acquisition strategies." 1 While our military can fight as a joint team, significant barriers stand in the way of efficiency and effectiveness. The challenge for the future is to eliminate, or at least reduce the effects of the obstacles and gain the synergy that jointness brings to the battlefield.
The Department of Defense (DoD) Transformation Planning Guidance made
Strengthening Joint Operations as one of the four pillars of defense transformation. 2 The DoD seeks to guide the transformation of the Services and DoD itself on the path to jointness through the Joint Operating Concepts, the supporting Joint Operations Concepts and Joint Functional
Concepts. One of the tools DoD established to facilitate this process is Executive Agency (EA).
Properly executed, use of an EA can be a powerful tool in promoting jointness among the Services.
This paper will lay a foundation by examining the conceptual underpinnings of EA and the changes resulting from Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5101.1, DoD Executive Agent.
It will then examine DoDD 5101.8, Executive Agent for Bulk Petroleum identifying significant changes that affect the Services and DoD. The paper concludes with recommendation for improving DoD EA for Bulk Petroleum as well as the EA program as a whole. watched closely in the halls of the Pentagon. In response, the USAF has developed an online tutorial aimed at increasing its personnel's awareness of EA.
CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS
The third change was to limit the appointment of an EA to instances where, "…No existing means to accomplish DoD objectives exists…DoD resources need to be focused on a specific area or areas of responsibility in order to minimize duplication or redundancy, or…is required by law, Executive order, or Government-wide regulation…where no existing means are available to accomplish the objective." These restrictions have greatly reduced the number of EA assignments. After DoDD 5101.1 was published, a review of the 269-USAF EA assignments resulted in reductions and the validation of only 59 designations. 9 The US Army experienced similar review and reductions. While no definitive list of Army EA designations existed prior to the DoDD 5101.1, the Army currently has 98 separate EA designations. 10 By limiting EA to only those areas that DoD considers essential, the Services have been able to focus their efforts, greatly improving the overall effectiveness.
The fourth significant change was establishing roles and responsibilities for managing the EA program. DoDD 5101.1 appoints the Director ODA&M to develop policy, coordinate EA designations, and maintain the EA designations listing. This centralized management has enabled the Services to better manage and coordinate across the spectrum of EA requirements.
The ability of the Services to share a common understanding of the many EA designations, and the accompanying responsibilities, functions, and authorities has gone a long way to clearing the fog and confusion inherent in the program prior to DoDD 5101.1
The fifth significant change is authorizing the Services to budget force structure for EA responsibilities. Some EA designations carry significant budgetary and manpower related requirements. The DoD EA functions previously where accomplished as extra duties or Ad Hoc organizations were used resulting in less than optimal results. The ability to properly budget and man these functions has contributed to the current efficiency and effectiveness of the program.
The concept of an EA, as defined in DoD 5101.1, is intended to force jointness on the Services and derive economies by standardizing processes, procedures, and systems across the DoD. The true challenge is in the application of DoDD 5101. The first significant change is that that DoDD 5101.8 directs the EA to, "Establish and maintain an integrated management information system to support the implementation of this Directive, to include: …Bulk petroleum management information and financial accounting system…visibility for US Government, allied, coalition, host-nation, and commercial bulk petroleum assets." 12 DoDD 5101.8 is broad in scope and subject to interpretation. The directive appears to require a DoD wide information management system that is capable of providing visibility of distribution systems, equipment, personnel as well as petroleum stocks.
The system would require the flexibility to integrate data not only from the Services but other US Government, allied, coalition, host-nation, and commercial activities. This task is daunting within the DoD, but the inclusion of non-DoD entities pose significant challenge for DLA.
In order to accomplish this task DLA (DESC) would have to field a capability with the ability to interface with DoD Services, other US Government, allied, coalition, host-nation, and commercial systems. DESCs current system, the Defense Fuel Accountability System (DFAS), has some of the required functionality but requires extensive training and is not flexible or adaptable enough to fulfill the stated requirements. DoD and the Services are migrating the their Logistics Information Systems (LIS) to the Global Combat Service Support System. In all cases, less the USAF, they are using a commercial off the shelf system based on SAP (Systeme, Anwendungen, Produkte) Inc. software. SAP is widely used in industry and by many allied militaries, and can be readily configured to interface with non-SAP based systems through NetWeaver, a SAP application designed for the purpose. The DLA has embraced this program and is currently fielding Business Modernization System (BSM), a SAP based LIS. DESC as a corporate entity has resisted the possibility of transforming DFAS into an integrated subcomponent of BSM. DESC has a significant corporate investment in DFAS and has been adamant that it be retained a stand-alone legacy system. So far, DLA has agreed to let DFAS continue as the DLA LIS for bulk petroleum. Given the scope of the information management task stated in DoDD 5101.8 this position requires reconsideration.
The second significant change revolves around standardization of equipment. DoDD 5101.8 states that the EA will, "Ensure effective end-to-end distribution for establishing equipment standards and interoperability requirements in collaboration with the Military Services and the Combatant Commands." 13 This directive has two significant impacts; first, it subjugates the Services Title 10 responsibility to equip the force and second it restricts the COCOMs ability to negotiate certain aspect of international agreements. has become a significant player in the operational and tactical level of support. The DESC's role on the battlefield has changed requiring a similar change in doctrine and the planning process.
To address this new reality the fourth change is that the EA will, "Participate in joint The fifth and last area of change is that the DESC is directed to, "Coordinate with the DoD
Components to expand joint bulk petroleum training…" 22 This is a daunting task, especially so as training management is not a DESC core capability. The DESC is a business entity founded on efficiency and economies which is often in conflict with military training. The idea of "training to standard not to time" is not easy to fit into the DESC business model. The CSG does provide a forum to discuss and coordinate joint training opportunities however the members of the CSG represent their Service supply function. Any agreements on expanded joint training would necessarily need to be coordinated through the individual Services training function. While EA will provide an expanded capability to dialogue on expanding joint training, there are significant roadblocks to success.
Under DoDD 5101.8 a paradigm has shifted; inland distribution is no longer the sole purview of the Army. It is clear that DoDD 5101.8, in spite of stating, "Nothing in this Directive alters the responsibilities of the DoD Components…" has resulted in a significant shift, requiring all DoD agencies to analyze and modify, as needed the current process. 23 The DESC has emerged as an operational entity in the COCOM force structure. It will take time to explore all the nuances of these changing relationships and to define the new roles and mission within DoD. It seems that DESC currently envisions little change in the Service roles but expects to have more influence COCOM and Service programs. In spite of significant authority, the DESC is hesitant to act where it may directly affect Service programs. The SECDEFs intent is that the EA exercise preeminent authority over the other DoD Services and Agencies within the assigned scope of the appointment. The current Bulk Petroleum EA directive is a starting point but requires substantial revision to truly be a forcing function for jointness.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The complexity of the EA function, the general nature of the DoD Directive and inherent conflict in guidance and doctrine has resulted in a period of opportunity to shape the future structure of petroleum support within the DoD. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, pointed out that, "This war, as unfortunate as war always is, provides momentum and focus and resources to transform that you might not have outside of this…and what we are able to do, as we rotate forces, as we reset them, is this momentum and focus allows us to reset them for the future, not reset them as they were in the past. And so this has given us a great forcing function to allow us to do it [reset] ." 24 It is critical that the DESC act now and decisively to capitalize on this moment in time and drive the Services toward the goal of Jointness. The DESC is on the right track but there are areas where change is necessary to achieve the SECDEFs intent for EA.
The first change needed is a comprehensive update and synchronizing of DoD regulations and Directives. The intent of EA from the beginning has been to empower an organization to lead the effort in a given area. In a briefing to the J4 EA Rapid Improvement Team it states that, "We must move from a perception of Executive Agents as merely one among many to a shared recognition and acceptance of Executive Agents as the first among equals." .25 DoD and DLA perpetrated the status quo by allowing the DESC to develop the wording for the EA directive.
The statement "Nothing in this Directive alters the responsibilities…" sends the signal that it is business as usual. 26 Clearly, this is not the intent, but sadly, it is the current reality. To correct this DoD should revise and synchronize DoDD 5101.8 and related publications in order to eliminate restrictions and barriers to the function of the EA. This effort would serve to synchronize the Services and empower the DESC as an agent of change.
The second change is that DoD should accept risk by maintaining DFAS at its current functionality while fielding a SAP based integrated capability. DLA, Army Material Command, Army, Navy, and Marines have adopted SAP, a commercial off the shelf program as their business standard. Of the Services, only the Air Force has resisted the move to SAP. As this program, moves through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System there will be ever increasing pressure for the Air Force to conform. In spite of DLA adopting SAP as its system, DESC chose to maintain DFAS for the future. The conjunction of DoD transformation and supplemental funding for OEF and OIF has provided the DoD with a window of opportunity for change. This period will not last long so it is critical that the DESC act now and migrate its automation system to SAP in order to better integrate its capability with the Services and DLA.
The third recommendation involves changing the management and focus for standardizing of petroleum systems. The acquisition of material systems or parts is not a DESC core capability or that of any of the members of the CSG. As system users, petroleum managers clearly have input into the process but, DLA may be better suited to this task than DESC. DLA has the expertise and routinely procures, stores and issues material for the Services. While the DESC has extensive experience in a similar capacity in the bulk fuels arena, there are significant differences between the storing fuel and material goods. DLA is best suited for this role and should retain EA for this area. Additionally, the focus of standardization should change from the system to the component level. A similar approach could apply to petroleum systems. By using required Performance Based Agreements, contractors could achieve a specified level of component standardization across a range of systems and could be incentivized to achieve even greater levels. As with procurement of materiel, storage, and distribution of material is not a DESC core capability. DLA has an extensive storage and distribution capability that would bring significant economies to the effort.
The fifth change is that DESC should fully embrace its operational warfighting role.
Currently the COCOM JPO consists of two or three field grade officers and a recently added DESC senior planner. This augmentation has clearly increased the JPOs capability but does not meet the operational need to rapidly expand operations rapidly during contingencies.
During a crisis, the JPO staff expands through a pick up team of individual augmentees and Service liaisons. To integrate into the warfighting function fully, DESC should organize and maintain a rapidly deployable augmentation package documented and battle rostered to the COCOM JPO. By focused training and participation in joint exercises, this staff could provide the JPO a core capability to call on during crisis. By fully integrating into the joint and interagency process, DESC can be a combat multiplier for the warfighter.
The last recommended change is that the DoD should assign Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as facilitator for joint bulk petroleum training. DESCs core capabilities are the procurement, distribution and storage of energy products and is not the appropriate command to integrate joint petroleum training. This tasking is also duplicative of the JFCOM role as the Joint 
